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A VIRTUOUS STATE WOULD NOT ASSIGN
CORRECTIONAL HOUSING BASED
ON ABILITY TO PAY
Bradley W. Moore* †
Introduction
Pay-to-stay jails expose the moral tension between the dominant theories of punishment: retributivism and deterrence. A turn to a third major
moral theory—virtue ethics—resolves this tension. According to virtue ethics, the moral worth of an action follows from both the character of the
action and the disposition of the actor. Virtuous acts promote human flourishing—the central goal of life—when they are the right actions performed
for the right reasons. The virtue ethics theory of punishment suggests that
pay-to-stay jails conflict with the promotion of human flourishing. A virtuous state’s criminal justice system would not include fee-based incarceration
because it undermines the role of punishment in fostering practical judgment, an essential prerequisite to encouraging human flourishing. Neither
the retributivist desire to punish offenders equally in identical (and shoddy)
prison conditions nor the deterrence effect of requiring inmates to cover the
costs of their confinement is motivated by virtuous reasons. Furthermore,
the resolution of the pay-to-stay jails dilemma using virtue ethics highlights
why retributivism and deterrence should be rejected as theories of punishment in favor of a virtue ethics-based approach.
I. Retribution and Deterrence: Conflicting Answers
to the Pay-to-Stay Question
Retributivism, which imposes punishment in proportion to the criminal
offender’s moral desert, suggests that pay-to-stay jails are unjustified. This
deontological moral theory, based substantially on the writings of Immanuel
Kant, holds that punishment is a categorical imperative: the state has the
right and the duty to punish all morally blameworthy acts. This duty exists
irrespective of the positive or negative consequences that follow from the act
of punishment. Proportionate punishment brings human relations back into
the proper alignment that the morally blameworthy crime disrupted. From a
retributivist point of view—assuming that the original level of punishment is
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just—prisoners paying fees for more comfortable jail-time experiences receive less than their deserved punishment for a reason unrelated to their
blameworthiness: their ability to pay. Thus, retributivism would not permit
pay-to-stay programs.
Applying the other main theory of punishment—deterrence—to pay-tostay jails yields a contrary result. Deterrence actually favors pay-to-stay
programs. Like other utilitarian justifications of punishment such as rehabilitation and incapacitation, deterrence is a consequentialist moral theory:
punishment is justified if its positive consequences outweigh its harms. The
state should punish criminals only to the extent that such punishment sufficiently deters them and other prospective criminals from committing future
criminal acts. From a deterrence perspective, the decisions of California city
jails to implement pay-to-stay programs reflect a novel way to address acute
overcrowding and underfunding, both of which are social harms in their
own right. Pay-to-stay programs increase the overall welfare of jails and
municipalities by lowering net correctional costs while simultaneously decreasing deterrence only marginally. Offender participants in pay-to-stay
programs—perhaps due to a comfortable position in society correlated with
their ability to pay the fees—still wish to avoid returning to jail, indicating
that specific deterrence remains effective for the individual offender. For
example, in “For $82 a Day, Book a Cell in a 5-Star Jail,” the New York
Times described the attitude of one inmate who served her jail term in a payto-stay facility: “Ms. Brockett, who normally works as a bartender in Los
Angeles, said the experience was one she never cared to repeat. ‘It does look
decent,’ she said, ‘but you still feel exactly where you are.’” In fact, as the
conditions in pay-to-stay facilities are better than in regular jails, these programs cause less harm to the offender for the same (or nearly the same)
amount of deterrence. Only a subset of criminals (those who can afford to
pay) receive the easier jail experience, preserving the general deterrent
effect of jail on society as a whole. Meanwhile, jails—like their prisoners—
also benefit from reduced overcrowding. In short, deterrence levels do not
change significantly for pay-to-stay programs, and the programs alleviate
overcrowding and underfunding. Therefore, deterrence justifies pay-to-stay
programs.
II. A Virtuous Alternative
As deterrence and retributivism provide conflicting answers to questions
of the proper form and level of punishment for pay-to-stay participants and
other inmates, criminal justice requires a third moral theory for the justification of punishment. Virtue ethics, also referred to as Aretaic theory, offers a
viable alternative to deterrence and retributivism that better accounts for
both the practical and aspirational purposes of punishment. The essence of
virtue ethics is that the moral value of an action depends neither on its conformity to categorical moral rules, as in deontological theory, nor on the
overall happiness that the action causes, as in consequentialist theory.
Rather, the morality of an action depends on both the action’s character and
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on the moral agent’s disposition while performing the action. The central
purpose of virtue ethics is to answer the question, “How should I live?” instead of the question, “What is the right action?” Virtue ethics’ answer is
that a person should live in a way that cultivates the virtues necessary for
human flourishing. A moral agent exercises virtue through practical reasoning; knowing the proper action depends on wisdom, deliberation, and moral
judgment. In other words, a virtuous agent acts not just rightly, but for the
right reasons.
In On Aristotelian Criminal Law: A Reply to Duff, Professor Kyron
Huigens, the strongest advocate of a virtue ethics theory of criminal law,
describes the justification of punishment as follows:
Aristotelian punishment theory attempts to describe the criminal law in
terms of virtue. Virtue, for Aristotle, was not adherence to moral duties
against one’s inclinations, but a quality of exemplary practical judgment by
which the agent does right because the right is what he wants to do—not in
the sense that he wishes to comply with a rule, but in the sense that his
judgment is so well attuned to the good in ordinary affairs that the right
course of action and its objectives are desirable to him. I have argued that
the justification of punishment turns on an assessment of whether the defendant exhibited a lack of Aristotelian virtue in the conduct that violated
the criminal law, because the inculcation of this kind of virtue is a justifying end of the criminal law.

If criminal law’s function in society is to promote virtue, then punishment is justified only if it facilitates the development of practical reason: the
tendency and motivation to do the right act because one values the proper
reasons for acting rightly. When a criminal makes an unvirtuous choice,
punishment plays an educative role. Punishment does not act, however, as a
deterrent—a person should choose the right action out of a desire to do so,
not out of fear of sanction. A criminal offense constitutes a failure of practical reason: the perpetrator acted through the wrong means or for the wrong
ends. However, virtuous punishment habituates the offender to form a desire
to act rightly for the right reasons.
Therefore, practical reason should guide the state in deciding what punishment to impose. Imposing either excessive or overly merciful punishment
would not be virtuous if it inhibits rather than promotes the development of
practical reason in the offender. The state should also impose punishment
only for the right reasons—the cultivation of virtue and the promotion of
human flourishing. The correctness of the punishment depends on the practical wisdom present in the justice system as a whole. Individual judges
exercise practical wisdom when they determine fault and punishment.
Likewise, the policies of the state should be evaluated based on the extent to
which they reflect practical wisdom and instill virtue.
III. The Virtue Ethics Answer to the Pay-to-Stay Question
Pay-to-stay jail policies inhibit, rather than foster, the instillation of virtue and the promotion of practical reasoning. Consider first the prisoner
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relegated to standard jail facilities. Those prisoners who cannot afford payto-stay jail upgrades will likely feel resentment at their disparate treatment.
Jail already alienates many criminals and destroys a desire to act rightly for
the right reasons. Resentment of pay-to-stay jails can only exacerbate the
risk that prisoners will not experience punishment in a way that promotes
practical judgment. Second, prisoners who serve time in pay-to-stay facilities will be less likely to perceive punishment in a virtue-developing way.
Although they may feel less resentment, the sense of entitlement that they
may feel could blunt the educative effect of punishment. Finally, pay-to-stay
jail policies threaten the fostering of the state’s own practical judgment.
With these programs, the government has chosen to solve a broader crisis of
overcrowding and underfunding by taking advantage of the different wealth
levels of its prisoners, irrespective of the effect on these prisoners’ development of practical judgment. While citizens might believe that a program to
provide more funding for jails and reduce crowding is good for promoting
virtue, a state needs to create the right kind of program, for the right reasons. A state undermines the virtue-promoting function of the criminal law
when it creates a program that does not consider its citizens to be equal before the law.
Exploring the public reaction to the punishment of Paris Hilton, a recent
California jail guest, can further explain how virtue ethics best resolves the
problem with pay-to-stay jails. While resentment at the idea that Ms. Hilton
might pay for a more pleasant jail stay might sound like a retributivist concern, the amount of punishment is not the issue; forty-five days in jail for
driving with a suspended license is, if anything, on the harsher end of possible penalties. Rather, the nature and the function of the punishment are what
matter to most people. If Ms. Hilton receives a harsh punishment but does
not change her attitude towards the law, then people will still not be satisfied. The key role of Ms. Hilton’s punishment is to teach her to align her
character and her disposition with the virtues for a flourishing life, so that
she can make the choices that a virtuous moral agent would make. Virtue
ethics best explains the resentment people felt from speculation that Ms.
Hilton might opt for the more tolerable pay-to-stay jail facilities.
However, critics might raise two major objections to the use of virtue
ethics to resolve the pay-to-stay jails dilemma. First, virtue ethics begs the
question: there needs to be some agreement on what the virtues are before
society can say differential jail facilities are not virtuous. Second, society
already conditions the delivery of services on the consumer’s ability to pay
in many contexts—why should jail be different?
The virtue ethicist has a reply to these criticisms. First, virtue ethics is
impressive not because of how little agreement exists about what a flourishing life looks like but how much agreement exists. For example, in Nonrelative virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, the philosopher Martha Nussbaum observes that while local understandings of the virtues may vary, there
is wide cross-cultural consensus about what the virtues are. Furthermore,
even if some disagreement exists as to the constitution of a virtuous life,
virtue ethics is less likely to lead to absurd results than rule-based theories
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like retributivism and deterrence, which have more trouble managing equitable exceptions and moral complexity. Even if retributivism and deterrence
can codify the rules that should govern in a given situation, practical wisdom is necessary to apply those rules. Ultimately, it is the application of
practical wisdom, not the content of a moral code, that determines the outcome of a moral dilemma. Virtue ethics avoids the senseless application of
moral rules by allowing for a full appreciation of the equities in an ethical
conflict. Second, even if society as a whole is improperly structured on the
basis of ability to pay, it would not follow that virtue ethics is an invalid
moral theory; rather, society itself may need some restructuring in order to
further promote human flourishing. A society that better provides its citizens
the opportunity to live a flourishing life might start by eliminating pay-tostay jails, but it would not stop there.
Conclusion
Retributivism and deterrence should be rejected as the dominant theories
of punishment because the scope of a virtue ethics critique of the criminal
justice system would not end with pay-to-stay jails. Virtue ethics explains
society’s discomfort with municipalities’ pay-to-stay responses to overcrowding and underfunding. The virtuous state, through the application of
practical reason, would have chosen another solution, one that would promote practical reason in prisoners and citizens more generally. To the extent
that the current correctional system fails to develop practical reason in prisoners in other ways, many other reforms are necessary.
Shifting to a virtue ethics approach would best capture the true purpose
of punishment. Commonly cited problems with the prison system as a
whole—inordinate costs, inability to prepare prisoners for reentry into society, excessive mandatory minimum sentences—would likely find better
resolution if the state were to take a virtue ethics approach to crime and punishment. The dominant theories of punishment, deterrence and retributivism,
rely on moral rules that cannot account for the nuance and complexity of
competing moral claims. Therefore, as pay-to-stay jails show, the state cannot successfully balance the competing concerns of deterrence and
retributivism. Virtue ethics avoids this trap by focusing on character and
disposition, not on specific acts. As such, the state should reject retributivist
and deterrent justifications for punishment, and all criminal justice reforms
should instead be evaluated by the standard of whether or not the virtuous
state would choose such reforms.

